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RESUMEN 
El presente artículo estudia la emergencia del comercio y la prosperidad de la vida 
cívica en la Edad Media en relación con los cambios en la espiritualidad de la época y 
con la inclusión de los laicos en la vida religiosa. La aparición de las órdenes mendi-
cantes influye en la cada vez más preeminente posición y personalidad pública del co-
merciante así como en la concepción del valor religioso y social de la actividad económi-
ca. Las órdenes mendicantes reelaboran el estatuto de la actividad comercial y el espíritu 
que es condición de posibilidad para dicha actividad. 
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Mercader, actividad económica, pobreza voluntaria. 
ABSTRACT 
The article wants to study the re-emergence of commerce and thriving of civic life 
in the Middle Age in connection with the changes in spirituality of the time with the 
inclusion of the laity in religious life. The emergence of mendicant orders influences the 
increasingly prominent stature and public personae of the merchant and a conception of 
the religious and social value of economic activity. Mendicant orders re-elaborate the 
status of commercial activity and the spirit that is condition to that activity. 
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In surveying the influence of transformations in religion and spirituality on 
the course of Western cultural and economic history, it is important to 
distinguish the character of the religious traditions of the time period under 
consideration. In this regard and in relation to the rising status of the figure of 
the merchant in medieval and Renaissance society in general, we must view the 
re-emergence of commerce and thriving of civic life in the Middle Age in 
connection with the tumultuous changes in spirituality of the time. Long-
standing monastic religious forms turned away from withdrawal into isolated, 
cloistered communities set apart from the world and toward a presence in newly 
developing cities. They focused their efforts on the broader inclusion of the laity 
in religious life.  
Through the emergence of the Franciscan and Dominian orders, dramatic 
emphasis was placed on the reform of the Church rather than its establishment. 
This was part and parcel of a rededication to charity, to intellectual clarity on 
the sacred order and moral life, and to preaching that was coupled with extreme 
ideals of voluntary poverty and purifying asceticism. A degree of discipline that 
had hitherto been joined to withdrawal from the world, made its way into the 
heart of cities and urban culture – along with an extraordinarily elaborate moral 
theology.  
The increasingly prominent stature and public personae of the merchant at 
the time shows all the marks of the intimate participation of leading religious 
and intellectual authorities, so deeply influenced by these religious orders, in the 
creation of a common cultural conception of lay religious practice. The religious 
life of the laity was at least in part to be pursued through the ordinary contri-
bution of goods and services to the common good. Indeed, without such a 
conception of the religious and social value of economic activity, there could be 
no public space for the status and deference increasingly accorded, not to 
merchants in general, but to a highly stylized stereotype of honest, patient, mo-
derate, prudent and public-minded, even Christian, merchants.  
Preachers and humanists of the time, with deep ties to the mendicant orders 
and their spiritual emphasis upon perfect charity and voluntary poverty, 
consistently emphasize an increasingly more precise ideal for the formation of 
a merchant’s character. They elaborate not only the particular rules which a man 
of commerce must abide by in his trade, but also the spirit in which he must 
work and the end which he must keep in mind. Both the ideal and the rules were 
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articulated as preconditions for obtaining social status – the earthly prize which 
awaited those merchants who performed valuable service to their Christian 
community. In what follows, we examine briefly the intellectual process of how 
Scholastics and preaching friars arrived at their re-evaluation of commercial 
activity and the requisites of interior spirit with which they sought to condition 
that activity.  
Our purpose here is to show how the broad intellectual-spiritual work of 
Scholasticism integrated the rise of the city into their vision of Christian 
civilization. Viewing ordinary lay life as a mode of life that could be conducted 
as a lay religious service, the Scholastics and preachers wove Christian ethical 
connotations into the private practice of commerce in such a way that many a 
merchant could grasp otherwise mundane bourgeois activities and economic 
virtues in a new, spiritual light. It is not that such conduct was simply conflated 
with virtue, but that the responsible conduct of business became a quasi-virtue 
particular to lay life. If this effort went a long way toward civilizing commerce, 
it undoubtedly also went a long way toward civilizing Christian spirituality. The 
notion of a good Christian certainly took on a more mundane and less ascetic 
character with the emergence of the concept of the spirit of poverty rather than 
actual destitution. So too, the notion of a “good” merchant, who conducted 
himself with a pre-approved Christian propriety and a spirit of measure in the 
pursuit of wealth, attained to the status of a “true” and justly “esteemed” 
merchant.  
Moreover, to the motivating weight of this ethical-religious and social 
approbation was added the concomitant recognition of the wealth that the 
merchant class created and the exalted dignity of his office. The respect and 
wealth that were the rewards of Christianly conducted commercial activity were 
of singular import in the formation of the social identity, self-image and inspi-
ring motivations of the merchant class. Commercial conduct was to conform to 
a certain standard of sociability, indeed to an exalted standard of perfect 
sociability of intention.  
It is often forgotten that the forces of political authority and coercive law 
are often exceeded by a meticulous social conformity that can be produced by 
inspiration through spiritual conscience and enforced by social approbation. If 
the law focuses on exterior actions as requisite conditions for justice in 
commutative exchange and in public action, we are here more concerned with 
the intention of the merchant as characterized by a sense of civic duty and 
discipline in his work that were the requisites of social approval and the origins 
of bourgeois social emulation and self-image. 
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I. THE MERCHANT IN THE MEDIEVAL ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION 
With regard to Scholastic economic thought and ethics, the tradition which 
the medievals followed was –as in so many cases– Aristotelian. Aristotle, ho-
wever, had not been particularly favorable toward economic activity. The 
Aristotelian conception of human political life as natural functioned as a strict 
limitation on many forms of economic activity. For, in Aristotle, the political 
life of man was, as has been repeated so many times, natural in a two-fold sense 
that ultimately precluded a number of economic activities as “unnatural.” First, 
the city is called natural in Aristotle on account of its origins, i.e. insofar as it 
arises from the struggles of familial life aiming to provide for basic human needs 
and the needs of their families through production and through the obvious 
benefits of entering into economic exchange with other families in the formation 
of villages. For insofar as even those villages themselves also fail to provide for 
a sufficient economic life and a fully human life, the city arises as a final step. 
Secondly, the city is natural on account of its end, i.e. insofar as what is natural 
to man is a certain ethical and intellectual development that requires leisure for 
virtuous pursuits of a higher kind and for the exercise of the higher faculties of 
thought as well as a community within which he might enter into intellectual 
discourse and into acts of justice, law and liberality. In other words, as man 
moved from the isolation worthy only of beasts or gods, his needs and desires 
lead him into familial, village and city life, but the purpose of life in the polis 
was not simply further fulfillment of the lower ends, but all that the fulfillment 
of those lower ends makes possible in terms of human flourishing. The 
movement of man toward political life is thus to be accompanied by an ethical 
development requisite to the sociability of man and to the true engagement of 
his higher faculties.   
The fact that communal life had this two-fold end of sufficiently providing 
for human material needs and providing for human ethical development means 
that any conduct not suited to ethical development and not suited to the mainte-
nance of communal life was to be viewed as unnatural and prohibited. Now, in 
order to determine the functions and ends of the activities and asso-ciations that 
form the city, and place upon them their limits in accord with their orientation 
toward human ethical perfection and the maintenance of communal life so 
important to it, Aristotle enters into an analysis of those parts of the political 
whole.  
As is his general method, Aristotle first “determines ... the things that be-
long to the first parts of political community. Second, he determines things that 
belong to the political community itself. ... And because every political 
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community is composed of households as parts, we need first to speak of hou-
sehold management, which dispenses goods or governs the household.”1 The 
place of economics in the movement from isolation to political life is, then, 
perhaps best but only partially characterized by the original terms, oikos, which 
means “household” and, oikonomia, which means the governance of the hous-
ehold. This art is fundamentally associated with what was the primary unit of 
economic production in the ancient world: the familial agricultural unit. The 
management of the production and dispensation of private wealth amongst one’s 
family, servants and slaves was the art of economics.  
Nevertheless, the semantic terrain covered by oikonomia is not quite closed 
upon itself in Aristotle and thus the househould does not quite exhaust the 
matter. For the household is not a self-sufficient unit as far as leisure and the 
good life are concerned and it is drawn into exchange with other household 
units: “[t]hese first associations are presented as being incomplete, or perhaps 
“immature,” but they seem to point beyond themselves to an end or completion; 
the mature association which is this end is the city (1252b31-34). [As indicated,] 
the city is thus held to be natural not because it happens to develop from natural 
associations but because it grows from them: they mature into it.”2 They develop 
into maturity because in and through their relation to broader human association, 
families and villages are gradually subject to the limitations and rules of conduct 
requisite to the maintenance and success of that broader communal life, which 
itself is requisite to human perfection. The question is just how far the art of 
economics extends within the bounds of communal life. Put another way, the 
natural character of economic activity is determined both by human ethics and 
the requirements of community. 
Man’s entrance into relations of exchange, therefore, is the beginning of a 
process. It is critical to acknowledge that the final end, human perfection, go-
verns the extent of that process –including economic activity. Man enters into 
further social relations of exchange with other families on account of his needs 
and for the purpose of a better life, ultimately the good life –nothing should 
impede the development of that good life or militate against the community that 
provides for that life. The development of exchange relations in the grouping of 
families in a village is, therefore, more than the emergence of casual or quasi-
regular exchange of goods. It entails the problem of equality and justice both in 
exchange and in the social order aimed to govern the community that require 
1    Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics, trans. Richard Regan, Indianapolis, IN; 
Hackett Publishing Co., 2007, 21. 
2    Wayne Ambler, “Aristotle’s Understanding of the Naturalness of the City,” The Review of Po-
litics 47, 2 (1985): 163-185; 168-169. 
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man to conduct himself well in his relations with others and in relation to the 
community as well as the community’s relation to its members. 
Justice and equality in social relations are, for Aristotle, inextricably linked. 
It should be noted first, however, that prior to its determination with respect to 
social relations, justice is first and foremost a general ethical condition: “Aristo-
tle, father of European ethics, formalized moral analysis in terms of the ‘ethos 
of the mean’: ideal conduct in the dimension of each virtue is a mean between 
extremes.  For instance, in terms of confidence in oneself, the virtue of courage 
is a mean between cowardice and rashness.”3 General justice, then, is the general 
form of virtue, giving due weight to the proper mean between courses of action. 
This general or universal justice is compounded in connection with the various 
virtues, forming a more general ethos of moderation in conduct: “nothing too 
much.” Yet that point of moderation, precision with respect to “too much” or 
“too little” is determined in connection with circumstances of life and its broader 
ends. General justice thus carries a sense of global balance of the person –
balance which is at once the ordering of life according to reason and the control 
of self that frees one for reasoned, free action –free for rationality as opposed to 
animality.  
In connection with social relations, considerations of justice are determined 
in relation to the ends for which one entered into communal relations and the 
conditions required by communal relations. In this regard, insofar as justice is 
related to one’s interaction with others and with the community as a whole, justi-
ce is divided into two virtues which are both intimately connected with equality: 
distributive justice and commutative justice. The first concerns relations 
between the individual and the community as a whole; the second concerns 
relations between individual members of the community. That is, the first 
concerns what the community owes to a man as a member thereof and what a 
man owes the community as a whole: for instance, the distribution of rewards 
3    Odd Langholm, Price and Value in the Aristotelian Tradition (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1979), 13; for an insuperably thorough treatment of Scholastic economic thought at 
Paris from the perspective of economic analysis: Odd Langholm, Economics in the medieval schools: 
wealth, exchange, value, money and usury according to the Paris theological tradition, 1200-1350 (Lei-
den: Brill, 1992); The merchant in the confessional: trade and price in the pre-reformation penitential 
hanbooks (Leiden: Brill, 1992). As our purpose is expressly not to treat Scholastic economic thought 
from a purely or even primarily analytical perspective, the discussion may be delimited: we are 
interested in the relationship between “general justice” and the definition of “need” in connection with 
the history of Scholastic economic ethics. The placement of “need” within that framework is not 
necessarily to immobilize its conception in “traditional needs” but it is certainly to bind it within a 
hierarchy of values that rounds out a picture of “balance”, just as much as the turn from general justice 
to particular justice, distributive and particularly to heavy emphasis on commutative justice, may carry 
significant shift in meaning for the relationship between “needs” and their “bounds.” 
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of honor, payment for services on behalf of the community, use of taxes and 
other common goods (e.g. communal lands or wealth –but it is not the re-
distribution of wealth that is not in common, i.e. private wealth, but wealth that 
is in common) as compared with the distribution of taxes or military service. 
The second concerns what one owes to another individual member of the 
community in interacting with him, for instance, in economic exchange. It is 
essential to note that the two, despite their distinction, are not for that reason 
disconnected, nor unrelated to the general justice of the individual.  
For the fulfillment of distributive justice through one’s obligations to the 
community and the community obligations to its individual members are, in 
effect, as they are so evidently felt to be when they are infringed (evasion of 
taxes or military service is the abuse of those who must pay or fight in one’s pla-
ce or the minority oppressing the majority in an unjust distribution of common 
goods or turning the distribution of public goods to their own advantage and 
thereby illegitimately increasing the sphere of private wealth), relations between 
individual members as well. So too for commutative justice, the violation of 
justice with respect to another member of the community is also violation which 
tends to disrupt the community as a whole, it violates the law and, especially if 
it becomes commonplace, brings the authority of law itself into question, requi-
res court adjudication and expense or provokes greater dispute and disorder. 
Moreover, the very relation of the individual to these senses of justice is one that 
calls upon his individual moderation to recognize and conform to the limits pla-
ced upon him so that “nothing too much” ought generally to be the habit of civi-
lized men who recognize the community as to their benefit and behave a-
ccordingly. 
In this way, there is a sense of measure and harmony preserved throughout 
the whole of communal interaction. That harmony requires different forms of 
conduct and degrees of participation in connection with different relations that, 
despite their potential harmony, are not characterized by the same measure. How 
well one served in a given function may well be, in accord with one’s abilities, 
greater or lesser and therefore deserving of a greater or lesser reward in pro-
portion to one’s performance. What one owes to another individual member in 
economic exchange, however, is not proportional to anything other than the 
thing which he offers in that exchange. In other words, justice is concerned with 
relations of equality, but not all relations of equality are determined in the same 
manner: there is proportional equality and there is arithmetical equality. The 
former characterizes distributive justice and the latter is typical of commutative 
justice. In commutative justice, the persons are presumed equal as citizens. 
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In his discussion of economic exchange, therefore, Aristotle is dealing with 
questions of commutative justice. The exchange first discussed is that of barter 
at a village or early civic level, while the introduction of money for the further 
facilitation of exchange belongs to the more formal relations of the city. Yet 
barter exchange reveals the essential purpose of exchange in general. For where 
barter exchange is concerned, the intention of the participating individuals is a 
certain equality between things exchanged (commodities, C – C). The question 
ethically and economically is how, precisely, to determine the equality of 
disparate things: what is the measure of their value in exchange? What is of key 
import is that barter exchange aims to overcome the insufficiency of the house-
hold to obtain to the good life. Need and desire bring villages into communion 
wherein exchange is of different things for something considered of equal value 
but evidently of quite a different kind: “Justice in exchange ... requires ... 
reciprocity ... but according to a proportion which takes into account the diffe-
rent values of the goods exchanged. Aristotle presents a cast of economic cha-
racters: a doctor, a builder, a shoemaker, a farmer, and some of their products: 
a house, a shoe, food, stressing their social interdependence and the need for 
exchange. ... It is not two doctors that exchange, but a doctor and a farmer.”4 
The problem, again, is how to bring disparate objects under a common measure 
and it is a communal problem insofar as the measure was necessary for a 
reciprocity of equality, equality for exchange and exchange in community: 
“Commercial buying and selling had replaced mutual gift giving long before 
Aristotle’s time, and he gives fair exchange primacy over the other forms of 
justice in book five of the Nicomachean Ethics just because it provided philia 
for an activity which he knew to be more basic than any other in the life of the 
polis.”5 In other words, Aristotle retains a significant sense of the mutual gift-
giving of honor cultures of the ancient world in his vision of community and 
economic exchange: “[i]t was a vitally important subject, because exchange was 
what cemented society together: ‘for neither would there have been association 
if there were not exchange, nor exchange if there were not equality, nor equality 
if there were not commensurability.’“6 The “impersonal” nature of exchange is 
actually the personal recognition of citizen equality –a positive favorable de-
parture from that equality is not an act of exchange but of friendship exceeding 
a merely communal minimum, a negative violation obviously implies a betrayal 
of that community and a fundamental disrespect of the other. It is, therefore, 
4    Langholm, Price and Value in the Aristotelian Tradition, 15. 
5    Scott Miekle, “Aristotle on Equality and Market Exchange,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 
111 (1991): 193. 
6   Diana Wood, Medieval Economic Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 134. 
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important that there be a clear measure according to which such equality can be 
effected. 
Aristotle’s response is somewhat alternating as he introduces the use of 
money in exchange: “In this development, Aristotle introduces two attempts at 
a solution which appear and reappear, interweaving with each other and with 
observations which contradict them. The first of these is the idea that money, 
just because it is a common measure of everything, makes goods commensu-
rable and thus makes it possible to equalize them. The second is the idea that it 
is need (chreia) which makes things commensurable.”7 Yet scholarship, indeed 
medieval scholarship as well, has brought the two together in such a way that 
disparate goods are brought into equality “through an intermediary, money, 
which, as he asserted, ‘measures all things, and therefore the excess and the 
defect –how many shoes are equal to a house or to a given amount of food.’ Of 
course, as Aristotle admitted, it was impossible that ‘things differing so much 
should become commensurate, but with reference to demand [need/chreia] they 
may become sufficiently so.’ What was being measured by money was human 
need.”8 Thus, in the move from barter to a monetary economy, the C - C, 
commodity to commodity relation of equality which was directly made possible 
by a measure of human need is removed to an indirect C - M - C (commodity-
money-commodity) relation which nevertheless finds the commodities as 
measured by human need with money facilitating the exchange. The first form 
of exchange, namely barter, is entered into for the benefit of participating parties 
and is referred to as natural inasmuch as it aims at the satisfaction of needs. 
Now, the reason that money is introduced is precisely to facilitate this same form 
of exchange: namely, the fulfillment of human needs. That is, it does not alter 
the basic intention of production and exchange. Production, a function of the 
household, is intended to satisfy the needs of the household and exchange is a 
casual affair, a bi-product of that domestic process whereby some have more of 
one thing than another or find that they could usefully exchange goods to their 
mutual advantage and as such belongs to the art of economics. 
Yet “Aristotle is analysing the evolution of social relations of exchange 
through their successive historical forms, subjecting each to an analysis of the 
aim inherent in its form, and evaluating where necessary the compatibility of 
that aim with the aim of the koinonia [community] of the polis.”9 In these 
successive forms, the introduction of exchange, but especially money inasmuch 
7    Scott Miekle, “Aristotle on Political Economy of the Polis,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 
99 (1979): 59. 
8    Wood, Medieval Economic Thought, 134. 
9    Miekle, “Aristotle on Political Economy of the Polis,” 61. 
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as it makes possible a greater amount of exchange than that possible only when 
two men happen to have roughly equivalent goods at roughly the same time, 
brings with it the possibility of a third alternative in production and in exchange 
relations. Though not expressed, the implicit assumption is that facilitation of 
exchange which money makes possible also functions to enlarge the extent of 
the market significantly and opens the possibility of production expressly for 
exchange as a way to increase one’s domestic wealth: 
“But this led to a way of exchange devised by reason. For the use of money 
was necessarily acquired when there was more foreign trade of necessary 
imports and surplus exports, since not all the things that peoples naturally need 
are easily transportable. ... Therefore, after necessary exchanges resulted in 
money, another kind of moneymaking, commerce, arose. Therefore, it was at 
first perhaps done simply, and then, with experience, it became more skillful, 
and so also people learned whence and how to make the greatest profit out of 
exchange.”10 
However, quite contrary to any future Smithian impulses, Aristotle does not 
laud the birth of production for exchange (crematistike) and the art of commerce 
(which invariably slides toward the art of production for exchange in the 
unlimited pursuit of wealth which is viewed negatively as unnatural and referred 
to as kapelike). Instead, Aristotle, appears to equate the natural with the ethical 
and the way devised by reason as grossly absorbing infinite desire for material 
wealth contrary to the whole purpose of production to meet one’s household 
needs within the bounds of what is sufficient to live the good life. Indeed, 
already in the discussion of the introduction of monetary exchange, “[t]here are 
indications of a rather different attitude to C-M-C in Aristotle’s mind. For 
example, in 1257a6 f., he says that the use made of a shoe in selling it ‘is not its 
proper and peculiar use’. The reason he gives is that ‘the shoe has not been made 
for the purpose of being exchanged’. He does not go as far as to say that its use 
in exchange is unnatural, but this only glosses over, and does not remove, the 
suggestion of a possible irreconcilability between ‘necessary and laudable’ 
exchange and the use of an article in exchange not being its ‘proper and peculiar 
use’. ... if the text suggests anything, it suggests that there was a real 
ambivalence in Aristotle’s mind towards exchange of the C-M-C form. On the 
one hand he sees it as sharing the same natural aim as C-C; but on the other, 
though recognizing it as a stage in the development of exchange relations, he 
also sees it as leading inevitably over time into M-C-M or kapelike.”11 This 
10    Aristotle, The Politics, in Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics, 49. 
11    Miekle, “Aristotle on Political Economy of the Polis,” 63 
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latter, that begins with money and seeks to increase money, is found to be a 
perversion of individual ethics and a disruptive force in the ends of communal 
life of the city. 
For Aristotle finds that all intent to produce purely for exchange and 
enrichment nearly invariably leads to the effort to turn money to a profit and 
then turn a profit anew in an unceasing endeavor to increase one’s wealth 
without regard for any limit of sufficiency for the needs of the household and 
human life: “Therefore, he says first that the reason for this disposition, namely, 
that household managers seek to increase money without limit, is because 
human beings are eager to live howsoever, not to live well, which is to live 
virtuously. For, if they were to strive to live virtuously, they would be content 
with things sufficient to sustain nature. But since they omit this effort and want 
to live according to their will, each of them strives to acquire things with which 
to satisfy the individual’s desire.”12 In fact, apart from its individual neglect of 
the good life, such an aim corrupts society as a whole, perverting the purposes 
of the various professions found therein and even virtue is turned to sale of itself: 
“And they abuse their faculties (i.e. their virtues, skills, or position) in ways 
contrary to their nature. For example, courage is a virtue, and its proper function 
is to make human beings bold for attacking and withstanding, not to accumulate 
money. ... So also, military skill is for the sake of victory, and medical skill for 
the sake of health, but neither skill is for the sake of money.”13 Nor does 
unchecked desire fail to pervert justice in exchange as it aims to derive a profit 
even at the expense of equality of exchange. 
In reviewing the situation, however, Aristotle does allow for some limited 
degree of exchange: “[i]n his last word on the two circuits C-M-C and M-C-M 
Aristotle papers over all the cracks and allows C-M-C past the post: the art of 
acquisition has two forms, one connected with household management which is 
‘necessary and laudable’, and the other connected with retail trade which is 
‘justly censured’, 1258a33 f.”14 Thus we might well say that, for Aristotle, it is 
not so much that the extent of the market limits productivity but that the ethical 
sufficiency of productivity ought to limit the need for a market society. That 
limit and the censure of trade which goes beyond it are joined to concern with 
the notion that such activities were not only contrary to individual ethics and 
human perfection, but to the social harmony established by justice inasmuch as 
it potentially converts everyone into money seekers and threatens the equality 
of goods exchanged. The art of economics, belonging as it does to the 
12    Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics, 57. 
13    Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics, 57-58. 
14    Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Politics, 63. 
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household, only peripherally touches upon a limited form of commerce that 
Aristotle condones with great reservation while disapproving of all that aims at 
wealth-getting per se. 
II. ON COMMERCE AND THE PERFECT MERCHANT
In contrast to Aristotle’s disapproval of production for exchange and strict 
denunciation of commercial activity, it has often been noted that Aquinas, 
joining a great many other Scholastic authors, “vindicates” trade and profit: 
Nevertheless, gain which is the end of trading, though not implying, by its 
nature, anything virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything 
sinful or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents gain from being 
directed to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading becomes 
lawful. Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate gain which he seeks 
to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his household, or for the assistance of 
the needy: or again, a man may take to trade for some public advantage, for 
instance, lest his country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an 
end, but as payment for his labor. 
That is to say, Aquinas says that trade in and of itself is neither virtuous nor 
sinful. The widening scope of and emphasis on intention makes possible the 
incorporation of trade from simple household exchange into rather extensive 
commerce – still bounded, it is true, by the proper needs of the community and 
the advantage of the common good in an ethical sense, but nevertheless within 
the bounds of licit conduct.  
However, despite the “vindication” of trade, far more attention is paid by 
Scholastics to the intentional and ethical requisites for licit economic activity 
than is paid to justifying it. True enough, it is in and through that attention, as 
we shall see in the following section, that Scholastics came to recognize the 
value of the merchant’s work and the beneficial effects of his trade on the basis 
of their gradual development of an economic theory of prices and the returns 
due to the rarity of the merchant’s skill. Yet their initial “vindication” of his 
trade did not laud the grandeur of his performance so much as simply recognize 
the serviceable intention and ethical character with which he might have 
conducted it. 
In fact, there is a progression and increasing tension in the distance between 
the nobility of work and the contribution of the merchant. Praise of dedication 
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and nobility in conduct of business is one thing, but praise of its successful and 
beneficial effects on the city and therefore of the intensive dedication in business 
is another. The former recognizes work, the latter acknowledges status; to the 
first correspond private virtues, to the second public virtues. The natural 
progression from the former to the latter is a conjecture of the age just as much 
as a growing sense of their potential disjunction and tension is typical of the 
period’s preoccupation with hipocracy. 
In short, what is first important to the Scholastics is the intention with which 
business is undertaken and the manner in which it is conducted. Predictably, 
business is licit when aligned with human needs, the needs of one’s family and 
the common good. Intention then, it appears, is a category over-looked by 
Aristotle’s condemnation of trade as ‘justly censured.’ Intention may be virtuous 
in wealth-creation beyond the needs of one’s person and family, because it 
might be undertaken for the community as a civic service, the fulfillment of 
civic duty. Concern with temporal goods, according to the medievals, with their 
production and exchange, could be conducted virtuously, but it required proper, 
responsible care rather than being driven by avarice and cupidity. A true 
Christian merchant, therefore, possessed a certain attitude toward economic 
activity –this attitude was indeed concern [sollicitudo] with material goods and 
services, but it was prudence in dutiful business and not clever greed, obsessive 
preoccupation and grasping deception. Only on the basis of such good and 
prudent conduct, the virtue particular to a good merchant, was his work 
accepted. Only thereafter was the recognition of exceptional performance in this 
regard highly valued as a contribution to the community. The former co-
rresponds to his legitimation as the path of a lay Christian, the possession of an 
upright officium within the community. The latter marks the rising stature of 
that officium in connection with the priority attached to the common utility of 
material wealth. 
Indeed, in his Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas had dwelt upon the 
question of prudence and solicitude in connection with a variety of objects, 
among them, external temporal goods, that is, material wealth: 
On the contrary, Our Lord said (Matthew 6:31): “Be not solicitous . . . saying, 
What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?” 
And yet such things are very necessary.15 
15    Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 55, a. 6, reply. 
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Solicitude [sollicitudo] is an ambiguous word. In the early middle ages, it 
had long stood for something approximating avarice, an absorbing concern with 
the pursuit of worldly goods and was used as a word of caution against 
commercial activity: “in the Latin of evangelical derivation used by eccle-
siastics, it indicated concern for things in the world and so might seem to 
promote an attitude of potential and perverse attachment to wealth.”16 In the 
high middle ages, the word still carries this negative connotation. For example, 
not coincidentally an example indicative of the ultimately victorious new view 
of wealth, the word is used precisely in this negative sense in the Papal bull, Ad 
Conditorem Canonum, issued in 1322 by John XXII (who deeply favored 
Aquinas and the Dominicans). Therein John XXII renounced Church ownership 
of the Franciscan order’s property so that the Franciscans could no longer claim, 
as was all important to radical Spiritual Franciscans view of their order’s 
conception of a perfect life, to own nothing at all both individually and in 
common. In other words, Franciscans could no longer hold the ideal of absolute 
poverty up as the Christian ideal (lending timely authority to the moral 
ambiguity of wealth). The Papal pronouncement reads: 
“Indeed, the above mentioned reservation of lordship [ownership of Franciscan 
property by the Roman Church] has by no means benefited the Brothers in 
respect of the state of perfection; for since the perfection of Christian life 
principally and essentially consists in charity-which the Apostle calls the bond 
of perfection, which unites or in some measure joins man, while on the way 
[i.e., in this life], to his end. Contempt of temporal goods and renunciation of 
ownership of them opens the way to this perfection especially because the 
solicitude that acquiring, preserving and dispensing temporal things requires, 
which commonly impedes the act of charity, is cut off. It follows that if the 
same solicitude persists after such divestment of ownership as existed before 
it, such divestment can contribute nothing to such perfection. But it is certain 
that after the above ordinance the Brothers were no less solicitous in acquiring 
and preserving those goods, in court and otherwise, than they had been before 
it, or than other mendicant religious who have some things in common”17. 
The obvious implications of this use of “solicitude” are that true poverty 
was solicitude for charity and God alone and that this Christian perfection was 
16   Giacomo Todeschini, Franciscan Wealth: From Voluntary Poverty to Market Society (St. 
Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute, 2009), 119. 
17   Pope John XXII, Ad Conditorem Canonum, trans. John Kilcullen, italics my own: http:// 
www.mq.edu.au/about_us/faculties_and_departments/faculty_of_arts/mhpir/politics_and_internationa
l_relations/staff/john_kilcullen/john_xxii_ad_conditorem_canonum/ 
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a spirit of poverty rather than actual destitution. Actual poverty was but a useful 
discipline that, if it did not work in rooting out the solicitude for wealth that 
conflicted with charity, added nothing of itself to human perfection. Thus the 
meaning of solicitude was, in accord with Aquinas as well, dependent upon the 
true end of the activity with which it is concerned. 
In one sense, therefore, where it is an inordinate concern for wealth, 
solicitude is and leads to sin: 
“[S]olicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in three ways. First on the 
part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. 
Hence Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): “When Our Lord said: ‘Be 
not solicitous,’ etc. . . . He intended to forbid them either to make such things 
their end, or for the sake of these things to do whatever they were commanded 
to do in preaching the Gospel.” Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may 
be unlawful, through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal 
things, the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which 
ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written (Matthew 
13:22) that “the care of this world . . . chokes up the word.” Thirdly, through 
over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary things if he does 
what he ought to do.18    
In another sense, where the question is whether it is licit to have solicitude 
for the future, it is contained within prudence itself. For Aquinas responds by 
placing solicitude within its proper time and season:  
No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with its due circumstances, and 
among these is the due time, according to Ecclesiastes 8:6, “There is a time and 
opportunity for every business”; which applies not only to external deeds but 
also to internal solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude; 
thus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and solicitude 
about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly, if a man were solicitous 
about the vintage during the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the 
solicitude belonging to a future time. Hence Our Lord forbids such like 
excessive solicitude, saying: “Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow,” wherefore 
He adds, “for the morrow will be solicitous for itself,” that is to say, the morrow 
will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the soul. ... 
18  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 55, a. 6, reply. 
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Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it would be an inordinate 
foresight or solicitude about the future, if a man were to seek temporal things, 
to which the terms “past” and “future” apply, as ends, or if he were to seek 
them in excess of the needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time 
for solicitude.19 
In fact, the prudent solicitude of today is opposed by a vice particular to it: 
negligence. Negligence is neither laziness nor sloth, it is neglect of due 
consideration given to the tasks at hand and to those it is necessary to prepare 
for properly, namely, when the morrow comes. 
Similar is found in many Franciscan authors such as Peter Olivi and Duns 
Scotus: “Significantly, in Olivi and his followers, this word assumes a different 
meaning depending on the context in which it is used. Being solicit ... in the case 
of merchants ... means being very attentive to shades of abundance, shortage, 
[etc.].”20 In this regard, the list of characteristics of the good merchant grew with 
Scholastic familiarity with trade, its practice and its benefits grew. Where 
Aquinas had found being solliciti good depending upon its end and worthy of 
payment, the merchant’s proper prudence was thereafter amplified and detailed 
by others, perhaps most originally by Peter Olivi. As qualified labor and diligent 
commitment, it morally justified a man’s good reputation and the profits that 
were the merchant’s wages: 
“As the artisan’s skill and industry licitly procure him profit, so too the industry 
of the merchant in prudently examining of the value and price of things, and 
attending to the smallest details of the just price, rightfully enable him to earn 
a profit within a certain latitude given by the just price.”21 
Duns Scotus as well puts forth what had Olivi had already said concerning 
the value of the merchant’s activity and legitimacy of his profits, namely, that 
they were justified by his service to the common good and by the difficulties 
and delicacies of the task: 
“Over and beyond the aforesaid rules as to what is just and unjust, I add two 
more. The first is that this exchange be something that is useful to the [repu-
19    Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 55, a. 7, reply and ad2. 
20    Todeschini, Franciscan Wealth, 119. 
21    Peter Olivi, cited in Todeschini, Franciscan Wealth, 118, “Sicut ars et industria artificis sibi 
licite fit lucrosa, sic industria mercatoris in rerum valore et precio prudencius examinando et ad subti-
liores minucias iustum pretium perducendo, potest sibi licit valere ad lucrum et maxime cum in hoc, 
salva latitudina iusti precii, aliis communiter prosit eciam in solo hoc quod per hoc addiscent subtilius 
pensare rerum precia et valores.” [translation partly my own]. 
The Spiritual Formation of the Bourgeois Merchant 173 
CAURIENSIA, Vol. XI (2016) 157-196, ISSN: 1886-4945 
blic]. The second that the price corresponds to a person’s diligence, prudence, 
and care as well as the risk one accepts in doing business. ... And from this it 
follows that the merchant, who brings such commodities from the lands where 
they abound to the country where they are lacking or who stocks such imported 
staples for sale that they may be quickly found by one wishing to buy them, is 
doing business that is useful to the [republic]. ... The second follows, for 
everyone engaged in honest work that serves the interests of the [republic] 
needs to live by his own labor. ... But this person who imports or stocks is 
serving the state usefully and honestly. Hence he needs to live from his labor. 
Nor is it this alone, but each can justly sell his industry and his solicitude. The 
industry of one transferring things from one country to another requires a great 
deal; one has to consider carefully what a country may need and with what it 
abounds. Therefore, one can justly go beyond what one needs to support one-
self and one’s family ... [to] a price that corresponds to one’s industry. Se-
condly, over and above this, a person deserves something that corresponds to 
the danger or risk taken.”22 
Thus what had hitherto seemed to imply “disquiet” and “restlessness,” 
namely, “solicitude,” is generally incorporated within the realm of labor which 
can constitute legitimate service. Yet it cannot be said that it was simply 
incorporated without transformation –and the filter through which it passed, 
which baptized and altered the image of the merchant and posited for commerce 
a certain ideal, was the concept of the common good and solicitude on behalf of 
that end. 
Yet the merchant’s industrious prudence was not the only factor in the more 
positive assessment of his work. Aquinas, with prominent reluctance, after 
pointing to the benefits of a self-sufficient city whose basic needs are fulfilled 
primarily from its own agriculture and artisans, after highlighting the dangers of 
commerce both for their instability and its insidious cultural effects,23 makes 
some allowance for commerce by recognizing the benefits it provides to the city: 
22    John Duns Scotus, John Duns Scotus: Political and Economic Philosophy, trans. Allan B. 
Wolter (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2001), 57. 
23     “Again, if the citizens themselves devote their life to matters of trade, the way will be opened 
to many vices. Since the foremost tendency of tradesmen is to make money, greed is awakened in the 
hearts of the citizens through the pursuit of trade. The result is that everything in the city will become 
venal; good faith will be destroyed and the way opened to all kinds of trickery; each one will work only 
for his own profit, despising the public good; the cultivation of virtue will fail since honour, virtue’s 
reward, will be bestowed upon the rich. Thus, in such a city, civic life will necessarily be corrupted.” 
Thomas Aquinas, De Regno, II, c. 3. 
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Still, trade must not be entirely kept out of a city, since one cannot easily find 
any place so overflowing with the necessaries of life as not to need some 
commodities from other parts. Also, when there is an over-abundance of some 
commodities in one place, these goods would serve no purpose if they could 
not be carried elsewhere by professional traders. Consequently, the perfect city 
will make a moderate use of merchants.24   
For Duns Scotus, apart from those merchants who attempt to corner the 
market and ignore the conditions of legitimate business and who ought on that 
account to be banished, the value of a good merchant is such that they ought to 
be sought out and brought into the country: 
“In an indigent country ... if the lawgiver is good, he ought to hire at great 
expense such merchants to import essential and indispensable goods and 
preserve and look after the things they bring. He ought to find not only the 
necessary sustenance for them and their families, but also make use of their 
industry and practical experience and underwrite the risks they take.”25 
In other words, the merchant’s service to his country was undergoing a re-
evaluation, not only in terms of its legitimacy within the bounds of Christian 
moral intention but also in terms of its value to his country. The two perspectives 
developed together in what was at the same time a greater appreciation for the 
difficulties of his work, with all the special efforts and talents it required in 
recognition that these could be put down, carefully, to prudence, love of family 
and country, and for his contribution to the material welfare of the community. 
This dual appreciation was not quickly forthcoming and was made with 
reservations, as is evident from Aquinas’ reluctance and Scotus’ double-edged 
distinction of merchants, those who were to be invited and those to be cast out. 
Yet it was indeed a trend thereafter both among Renaissance humanists and 
preachers. Coluccio Salutati, in a letter addressed to the city of Perugia, 
describes the merchants of Florence as “the sort of men who are indispensable 
to human society and without whom, in fact, we cannot live.”26 This was no 
exuberant endorsement, but an evident recognition that came despite Salutati’s 
equal emphasis upon the spirit of poverty that proved its virtue in handling 
worldly affairs with virtue and judgment. Nowhere is this combination of 
24    Thomas Aquinas, De Regno, II, c. 3. 
25    John Duns Scotus, John Duns Scotus: Political and Economic Philosophy, 59. 
26    Hans Baron, “Civic Wealth and the New Values of the Renaissance: The Spirit of the Qua-
ttrocento”. In: In search of Florentine civic humanism: essays on the transition from medieval to modern 
thought, v. I, 226-257 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 225. 
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approval and disapproval more evident than in the work of San Bernadino of 
Siena. For by “the fifteenth century, ... the attitude of churchmen toward trade 
had mellowed considerably. They were no longer able to shut their eyes to 
reality and ignore that agriculture had declined in relative importance and that 
the prosperity of cities and towns rested on trade and industry.”27 It is perhaps 
dubious that they had shut their eyes to this, but that their eyes became keener 
is clear. Indeed, Bernadino not only confirms the existing tradition that trade is 
licit and not sinful in itself, but rather poignantly stretches the example as he 
points out: 
“that buying and selling is not the only occupation leading to sin, but that this 
may be said of all callings, not excluding the episcopate, if the incumbent does 
not properly discharge the duties of his office.”28 
Moreover, Bernadino elaborates upon the valuable services that merchants 
provide –distinguishing three types of beneficial services that they conduct. 
First, “there are the importers-exporters (mercantiarum apportatores) who 
transport commodities from a country which has a surplus to another where they 
are scarce and in request, sometimes at considerable risk, trouble and 
expense”29. Secondly, there are the mercantiarum conservatores “who preserve 
and store goods ... importers and wholesalers who buy in large quantities and 
sell by the bale or the load to retailers, who, in turn, sell in minute quantities of 
a pound or even less to consumers”30. Finally, there are mercantiarum immu-
tatores seu melioratores “who transform raw materials into finished products, 
for example, make cloth from wool, shoes from leather, or candles from wax”31. 
Apart from the further detail which Bernadino adds to each of the foregoing and 
the by now perennial observation that the “only justification of business lay in 
the service and utility of the commonweal (pro republicae servitio et utilitate), 
Bernadino also gives greater attention to the characteristics of the good 
merchant. 
In this regard, Bernadino “fully recognized that managerial ability, far from 
being common, is a rare quality and that a scarce combination of competence 
and efficiency goes into the making of a successful businessman. San Bernadino 
27    Raymond de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence: The Two Great 
Economic Thinkers of the Middle Ages (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Printing Office, 1967), 
10. 
28    de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence, 10. 
29    de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence, 11. 
30    de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence, 11. 
31    de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence, 11. 
176 MARK HANSSEN
CAURIENSIA, Vol. XI (2016) 157-196, ISSN: 1886-4945 
lists four necessary qualifications: diligence or efficiency (industria), responsi-
bility (solicitudo), labor (labores), and willingness to assume riskes (pericula). 
First of all, merchants should be efficient, by which he means that they should 
be well informed about qualities, prices, and costs and be ‘subtle’ in computing 
risks and assessing profit opportunities, ‘which indeed very few are capable of 
doing.’ Second, businessmen should be responsible and attentive to detail, [here 
we interject to emphasize the connection to prudence and avoidance of neglect, 
a sense of duty] ... Nothing can be achieved without a great deal of trouble and 
toil. The merchants must be prepared to endure discomforts and to suffer 
hardships in crossing seas and deserts. They will unavoidably expose their 
persons as well as their goods to many perils. In spite of the best management, 
the businessman may be visited by bad luck and suffer a loss. It is therefore, 
meet that he should earn enough on successful ventures to keep him in business 
and compensate him for all his troubles.”32 Beyond these, a critical personal and 
professional feature is added: “Business integrity the Franciscan preacher prized 
very highly. A reputation of reliability was an asset ... A merchant was expected 
to keep his word, to respect his agreements with his partners, and to fulfill his 
commitments”; not to mention their religious duties of hearing “Mass on 
Sundays and feast days, take communion at least once a year, and confess their 
sins to a devout and God-fearing priest”33. In the conduct of useful service to the 
state, certain quasi-virtues peculiar to the work were to be esteemed and 
cultivated along with the obvious and general commitments of Christians to a 
religious life. This recognition that, beyond the general duties and affections of 
Christian life, beyond even the virtues commonly necessary to all men, there 
were “virtues” particular to one’s work and station is an addendum to one’s 
ethical constitution that is of broad significance. 
In the first general steps toward an image of the merchant, San Bernadino 
states that secular business can become unlawful with respect to the status of the 
person performing it (namely, lay or clergy - prohibited to clergy): 
“And therefore I say that the first thing to be done is this, that you must consider 
the person who doth carry on the business, whether he be secular or 
religious”34. 
Secondly, and still generally, 
32    de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence, 13. 
33    de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence, 14. 
34    Saint Bernadine of Siena, Sermons, edited by Don Nazareno Orlandi, translated by Helen Jo-
sephine Robins (Siena: Tipographia Sociale, 1920), 196. 
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“The second point to be considered in regard of him who doth carry on business 
is, from what motive he doth carry it on. I told thee of it yesterday; today I will 
tell thee again. I say that if he doth this to provide for his family, or in order to 
free himself from debt, or to marry his daughters, -- then I say it is permitted to 
him. But what shall we say of him who hath no need thereof, who doth so spend 
himself, doth busy himself here, doth busy himself there, doth this, doth that, 
and doth never cease? Say I, that unless he doth this for the poor, he doth sin 
mortally, since that such hoarding as this is called the sin of avarice”35. 
That charity and service are to guide business are clearly not in doubt, that 
they should inform business conduct is not new, yet detailing all the little ways 
that business can turn sour and become unlawful is a significant step toward the 
particularity of virtues specific to commerce. 
Nor was San Bernadino alone in such endeavors. Rather, apart from San 
Bernadino’s particular acumen and interest, this entire strategy of combining 
praise for noble conduct and exhortation to simple work was a common po-
ssession of preachers. San Bernadino’s contemporary, Giovanni Dominici, 
though far less interested and far more suspicious of merchants, nevertheless 
engaged in painting “a portrait of the ideal merchant. Dominici declared that a 
merchant was allowed to make great profits provided he made them ‘with grace, 
with charity, with direct and sincere intention, with reverence, peace, and love 
for his neighbor.’ ... On the whole, Dominici and Bernadino encouraged a si-
milar type of pious merchant to engage in honest commerce.”36 In fact, “all our 
sources concur in arguing that diligent industry is ‘dignified, necessary, and 
fruitful’, earning the labourer both reasonable temporal gain and eternal salva-
tion.”37 The efforts of the friars in the piazza and the confessional, then, were 
aimed at providing an ideal of behavior for the maintenance of justice in 
exchange and for the sake of fostering that sort of philia that ought to cha-
racterize communal life, but also, for the sake of just that sort of philia which 
was requisite to functional exchange relations: “Doing business or trading 
(mercari), and those who carry out these activities (mercator), are described 
more and more by Franciscans (and this habit will continue in the fourteenth 
century) as the concrete and everyday reflections of a sociability that the 
35    Saint Bernadine of Siena, Sermons, 196-197. 
36   Nirit Ben-Aryeh Debby, Renaissance Florence in the Rhetoric of Two Popular Preachers: 
Giovanni Dominici (1356-1419) and Bernadino da Siena (1380-1444) (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 
2001), 161-163. 
37   Bernadette Paton, Preaching Friars and the Civic Ethos: Siena, 1380-1480 (London: Short 
Run Press Limited, 1992), 167. 
178 MARK HANSSEN
CAURIENSIA, Vol. XI (2016) 157-196, ISSN: 1886-4945 
government must and should promote and institutionalize.”38 In this regard, a 
good merchant was not merely imbued with private Christian virtue, but was a 
model to his fellow citizens of the manner in which material wealth ought to be 
dealt with. A great merchant was further possessed of public virtues even more 
expressive of this same character. Such a man was to be all the more highly 
esteemed for the educational value of his conduct as an example in the 
community –and therefore, he was to be publicly honored, quite consciously 
held up as a social ideal. 
Useful service to the community, however, was not only delimited by 
exhortation to noble professions, but –importantly– by a general assessment of 
professions less than noble in themselves. For in the very same measure that the 
Christian merchant represented something more than a model of commercial 
success, so too his psychological, interior poverty, honesty and simplicity were 
also made to represent, on the side of production, what was already condemned 
on the side of consumption. That is, just as the preachers defined as licit that 
profit and consumption “which is necessary to maintain the worker and his 
family and provide them with food, shelter and other essentials but not with 
those things which are superfluous, such as an over-abundance of food and other 
delicacies,” so too on the side of production, the utility of professions was also 
bounded in some degree by Christian morals.  
It goes without saying that some trades do not generally appear as viable 
options to ethical economic agents, prostitution or slave trade. Beyond that, the 
range of options is always defined in some way –and preachers aimed at contri-
buting their moral criterion to defining the range of the useful: “Sant’Antonino 
is well informed about the structure of the Florentine textile industry ... [he] fully 
acknowledges that this industry fulfilled a useful purpose in providing clothes 
to protect the human body against cold and to cover its nakedness. Wool has his 
wholehearted approval, but objects to silk because it often serves vanity and 
waste, [etc.].”39 Indeed, “Sant’Antonino has something to say about nearly every 
profession or craft,” from architects and contractors to artists and musicians, his 
moral approbation or disapproval being converted into an attempt to convince 
merchants and artisans to focus on production and trade in things useful to and 
not corruptive of the community in a Christian sense.40 Doubtless, the effort was 
not supremely successful, although at the time the secular adoption of sumptuary 
and usury laws are not inconsequential (and can be imputed a variety of 
motives), in any event there is an evident sense in which the general recognition 
38    Todeschini, Franciscan Wealth, 125. 
39    de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence, 15. 
40    de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence, 15. 
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of the propriety of a given profession or action leans heavily on its perceived 
viability as a career or course of action. A life despised by the community is 
rarely the spontaneous choice of anyone but the more anti-social or desperate 
character.  
It is in this light that the preaching friars generally viewed their promotion 
of Christian poverty and simplicity as a fundamental touchstone of economic 
vision: a highly desired luxury or a highly profitable profession or opportunity 
may not be in accord with a simple and ordered use of the world, a just use in 
the sense of right reason oriented toward love of neighbor and of God. On the 
contrary, not a few luxuries, professions and opportunities served to corrupt the 
city, imply the maltreatment of neighbor and the violation of the justice that held 
the city together. In other words, the friars wished to encourage the simple, 
moral life as fundamental to the ethical sociability underpinning the market and 
civic life. If the particular profession of the merchant fell within the realm of 
what was useful to the community and was conducted in accordance with the 
same intention, avoiding all the pitfalls open to it in terms of sin, then it was an 
appropriate profession for the Christian and could be performed more or less 
nobly. Moreover, in the degree to which it was more or less nobly performed, 
the more or less it accorded with the justice in exchange that was the counterpart 
of the very philia and caritas that bound the city together. This, no doubt, goes 
far in establishing an ordinary sense of duty in work, almost a worldly 
asceticism, while nevertheless still attempting to hold that sense of ethical 
commercial pursuit well within the bounds of ordinate intentions and ordinate 
professional channels. 
Yet for those who performed their professions more nobly –and inci-
dentally, more successfully– the stage of rewards was set in accordance with the 
praiseworthy sociability that it presumably signified. This was so particularly 
with the advent of an explicit resolution of a long-standing ambiguity that had 
already implicitly received its Scholastic Christian answer. To the question of 
whether economics was simply the art of household management or whether it 
properly included also some broader range of activities, Sant’Antonino makes 
“the important point that the problem of ‘commutations’ or exchange is an 
economic matter which pertains either to household management –economics 
in the old sense– or to politics because the whole purpose of business is to supply 
either the household or the community with goods or services.”41 This drift of 
focal point from oikos to political economy was conjoined or parallel to the 
movement from private virtues of good order and simple, honest, prudent 
41    de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence, 14. 
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diligence to public virtues of liberality, magnanimity and magnificence as an 
example of that combination of simplicity and public-spirited perfection be-
longing to the Christian merchant who might guide others both in spirit and in 
practice –and receive the honors befitting a true merchant. To those who 
betrayed the ideal: “If merchants are not ‘honorable and trustworthy,’ writes 
Olivi, if people cannot generally trust their word, they are not real merchants.”42 
Indeed, just as Florentines were only true Florentines when they were true 
Christians, so to with merchants. It is not that public recognition made the 
merchant, though perhaps the aspiring merchant might well conceive of it thus, 
but, rather, it is worthiness of their recognition that made the true merchant –
and the actual recognition, which was now being accorded to their successful 
and servicable performance, was not a matter of their mere household prudence, 
but a scalar evaluation that extended toward political economy. 
To whatever extent, and a precise determination of its influence passes 
beyond the scope of our investigation, this whole ethical imagery was effective; 
that is, it was at least partly imbibed by the merchant class at the highest levels 
as formative of their social identity and group culture –and, most importantly, 
their aspirations. No doubt, among more ordinary bourgeois merchants and 
artisans, it had already given significant impetus to at least moderate ambition 
to some social standing as responsible and honest men at work, conducting 
themselves with dignity. With respect to the elements celebratory of the 
grandeur and civic ethos of merchants, however, this had an indubitable 
influence on their ethos of “simplicity” in noticeable, magnanimous Christian 
service and their regard for their high office as well as in their understanding of 
their own discipline and sagacity: “Dominici’s and especially Bernadino’s 
descriptions of the ideal merchant are very similar to those in the numerous trade 
manuals of the period. Dino Compagni declares that the merchant ‘will be 
worthier if he goes to church, gives for the love of God, clinches his deals 
without a haggle, and wholly abjures the taking of usury’. Other descriptions of 
the ideal merchant as ‘humble, loyal, solicitous, steady, honest, and orderly’ also 
echo the preachers’ views.”43 The rising popularity and spread of these 
handbooks extends into an entire genera “which summarized the basic 
knowledge that all merchants should have, took place along the northern 
Mediterranean coast from the fourteenth century onwards. These merchant 
handbooks amounted to more or less utopian ideological constructions which, 
apart from the collection of technical materials, established the moral bases for 
42    Todeschini, Franciscan Wealth, 124. 
43    Debby, Renaissance Florence in the Rhetoric of Two Popular Preachers, 162. 
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merchant activity.”44 Perhaps no display of this characteristic in the “mirror of 
merchants” literature is greater the manual of Benedetto Cotrugli in 1458: 
“The dignity and office of merchants is great and exalted in many respects, and 
most particularly in four. First, with great respect to the common weal for the 
advancement of public welfare is a very honorable [purpose], as Cicero states, 
... The advancement, the comfort, and the health of republics to a large extent 
proceed from merchants; we are always speaking, of course, not of plebeian 
and vulgar merchants but of the glorious merchant of whom we treat [and who 
is] lauded in this work of ours. ... 
Secondly, I exalt the dignity and office of merchants with respect to the useful 
and honorable management of their private properties and goods. As a matter 
of fact, a sparring, temperate, solid, and upright merchant increases and 
augments his wealth. … 
Third, the dignity of merchants is to be esteemed and appreciated with respect 
to association, both private and public. ... there is no room for rogues, retainers, 
henchmen of all sorts, partisans, thieves, runaways, and gamblers such as are 
want to live at the courts of princes, magnates, and lords. ... 
We have left for the fourth [place] the dignity of merchants with respect to 
[faith]…. It is generally said that today [good faith] abides with merchants and 
men-at-arms…. Neither kings nor princes nor any [other] rank of men enjoy as 
much reputation or credit as a good merchant.”45 
Scholarship has well established the religious overtones that thread their 
way through the merchant letters and writings that have come down to us. 
Perhaps suggestive of the loose fitting role, or gentle conditioning, that such 
moral vision and image had for the full range of commercial practice is the fact 
that such splendid exaltations and exhortations generally formed the preface and 
frame of the works in this genera; this is not to imply that it was mere rhetorical 
eloquence, but certainly it indicates that the honorable attire of the mercantile 
art could very well, and significantly, exceed the merchant’s conformity to the 
standard of his social identity. Perhaps, as is not uncommonly the case, the 
general image and tilt of ethics was more desirable than the full details of 
injunctions and restraints. For “Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, the merchant-
44   Jaume Aurell, “Reading Renaissance Merchants’ Handbooks: Confronting Professional E-
thics and Social Identity,” p. 74-75: http://dspace.unav.es/dspace/bitstream/10171/29296/1/Rea-
ding%20Renaissance%20Merchants%E2%80%99%20Handbooks%20.pdf 
45    Benedetto Cotrugli, On Commerce and the Perfect Merchant, (1458): http://www.ux1.eiu.edu 
/~cfdks/cotrugli.pdf 
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compiler of one of the more important handbooks in Renaissance Italy, a few 
sentences are enough to summarize the moral qualities that all merchants should 
strive to achieve.”46 And yet, the coincidence of moral and professional virtues 
was a constant theme in the literature –as was the patriotic and public-spirited 
self-image, not to mention the tense relation between public manners and public 
virtues of display in contrast to private virtues of simplicity and restraint as well 
as private vice and hypocrisy. The civility, courtesy and cultivation of the 
leading figure ought to be joined to sincerity –particularly so with regard to the 
sincerity and honesty of the merchant, his deep trustworthiness was a requisite 
of his profession as well as his social standing in a Christian community.  
III. THE DISCIPLINE OF PRUDENCE
This same almost sanctimonious baptism of professional virtues in their 
approximation and subordination to moral virtues, and the tension between that 
private virtue and the desire for public honors, is presented in that work made 
most famous by Werner Sombart, Della Famiglia, by Leon Battista Alberti.47 
For Sombart, “What today is called the capitalist spirit comprises within itself, 
besides the spirit of enterprise and the desire for gain, a complexity of certain 
qualities, to which I shall apply the term ‘middle-class virtues.’ These include 
all the views and convictions ... of a respectable citizen and head of a family, no 
less than of an honest tradesman. To the best of my knowledge we make the 
acquaintance of the citizen ... for the first time in Florence, at the close of the 
14th century.”48 There, in the Tuscan merchants of the late 14th and early 15th 
Italian renaissance, Sombart saw “a whole list of tradesmen and others 
intimately acquainted with trade ... [who] have bequeathed to us their views, set 
down in valuable memoirs or books of edification, ... the incarnation of the spirit 
of respectable citizenship.”49 In these writings, to which we have alluded in the 
previous section, with their “maxims that should govern life, the rules that make 
for respectability,” Sombart found the average and middle class bourgeois, 
disciplined and dedicated to business. He pointed to L.B. Alberti as “the most 
perfect type of the ‘bourgeois’ of those days,” and noted that “Alberti’s views 
were generally shared by a large number of people; and that they express the 
46    Aurell, “Reading Renaissance Merchants’ Handbooks: Confronting Professional Ethics and 
Social Identity”, 76. 
47    Werner Sombart, The Quintessence of Capitalism: A Study of the History and Psychology of 
the Modern Business Man, translated by M. Epstein (New York: Howard Fertig, Inc., 1967). 
48    Sombart, The Quintessence of Capitalism, 103. 
49    Sombart, The Quintessence of Capitalism, 104. 
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outlook on life then current in tradesman’s circles.”50 And Alberti’s views, as 
we shall shortly see, do indeed breathe the general ethos of a mercantile 
commitment to the rational organization of life in respectable business practice 
–and, more importantly, a pervasive sense that such activity was an extension
of responsible, dignified prudence requisite to social standing and distinction. 
Yet while this may be true, and it is certainly of eminent importance that 
the average and ordinary businessman of the age could seek some such standing 
as a respectable citizen precisely in commercial and artisan professions, we need 
not limit ourselves to the moment of triumph when such aspirations were 
prominent and definitive features of the late-14th and early 15th century Italian 
civic humanism in full flourish. One might just as easily point backward to the 
prior and gradual emergence of a respectable Christian merchant before the 
notion of a respectable citizen became a social ideal by which one was measured 
and, perhaps in something akin to Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy and moral 
sentiments, an ideal by which one measured oneself. For the merchant ethos and 
its respectability had begun to take shape long before the end of the 14th century. 
It had done so over centuries, so much so that it had already been on display in 
the grandeur of the late 13th century merchants who touched and tasted the life 
of the nobility.  
On the basis of this prior establishment of the merchant in the city as a 
respectable Christian, many illustrious figures of commerce had themselves 
risen over the long 13th century: “The few who accomplished this feat did so 
over three or four generations, and they were the first families of the republic in 
the early trecento. Such chroniclers as Giovanni Villani and Ricordano Ma-
lespini remembered well the humble origins of these new clans (‘novi cives’). 
Thus the way to preferment in Florence was through the entrepreneurial world 
of the greater guilds where new and old families mingled to form the energetic 
aristocracy of the late medieval business world.”51 Such families as the A-
ccaiauoli, Bardi, and Peruzzi had even begun to monumentalize their ethos: 
“Perhaps the greatest single testimony to the hubris of this Saturnian age is the 
Maso di Banco tomb painting done for the Bardi at about the same time (1335). 
In this work in the chapel at Santa Croce, Messer Bardi rises confidently from 
his marble tomb to meet God.”52 According to Marvin Becker, this earlier ethos, 
wherein “[c]hivalric daring is coupled with burgher cunning,” often showed its 
evident aspiration to take their place as elite Christian merchants close to the life 
50    Sombart, The Quintessence of Capitalism, 104. 
51   Marvin Becker, Florence in Transition: Volume One: The Decline of the Commune (Balti-
more, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 27. 
52    Becker, Florence in Transition, 54. 
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of the country nobility of landed aristocrats. Their energy, no doubt inspired 
thereby, was nevertheless often imperiled and exhausted in the purchase, but 
they strove for that reflected dignity nonetheless: “Seldom did the burgher ethic 
remain immune from ideals of largesse and honor. Moreover, even the less well-
to-do and the parvenu, no matter how tight-fisted, were drawn to the ennobling 
rural life, to the chase and the pastoral ease and spontaneity. There were very 
few, even among the artisan shopkeeper class, who did not own at least a piece 
of land or a small house in the countryside.”53 At any rate, by the time civic 
humanism was in full flourish, the mercantile elite of the later 14th century was 
not so enamored of the countryside and built their palazzos inside the city. 
Though obviously the dignity of nobility was of eminent importance to them, 
it’s character as landed and as chivalric-military was less and less appealing as 
merchants came more completely into their own. It is a question of degrees both 
in the lives of individuals and their pervasiveness in city life, yet Sombart tended 
to look more for the dominance of a respectable merchant-citizen at a time when 
lesser Christian merchants had already been accepted and even “heroic” figures 
had long been their more illustrious counterpart in an ideal of social distinction 
that thereafter endured in new forms in the late 14th century rise of the Medici, 
Alberti, Strozzi, and Pitti families. In short, the Christian merchant had already 
been forged as a worthy ideal and almost immediately became an object of 
social ambition and of lesser motives which only found themselves that much 
more exuberant in their pursuit of social distinction in an increasingly secular 
age, wherein they became respectable citizens and merchant-princes with their 
own dignity rather than Christian merchants often seduced by the allure of 
landed elitism. 
Such an allure, toward the conspicuous consumption of the feudal elite and 
noble, is in fact the start of Alberti’s dialogue. It is therein the allure to be treated 
with the greatest of caution. Indeed, the whole dialogue is inconclusive –it 
contrasts the more tempered aspirations of a Florentine merchant in exile, 
Giannozzo Alberti, who aspires to a quiet, moderate nobility with the views of 
a younger family member, Lionardo Alberti, who aspires to the illustrious 
admixture of a civic-centered merchant ethos. Indeed, if there is any conclusion 
in the dialogue, it is that this latter must be purged of its ostentation and display, 
its wanton miming of the nobility’s consumption patterns; it is that the ambition 
for glory must be true to virtue if it is not to ruin a house (as Alberti well knew 
from the fall of his family’s fortune at the hands of his imprudent cousins prior 
53    Becker, Florence in Transition, 15. 
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to his own career). Thus, the work begins with an amiable discussion of the 
follies of youthful and immature aspirations to grandeur. 
Is, in the first paragraph of the famed Book III on prudent management, the 
literary and historical figure, the aging merchant Giannozzo Alberti expresses 
his wish, as he does at the end of the chapter, to attend the Mass, and Giannozzo 
is then asked about the days of his youth. Giannozzo responds with an 
assessment of the jousting tournaments for honor in feats of military arms and 
grandiose expenditures of youth that he once entertained that dismisses these 
and much beside as the folly of men who have not yet or never learned the value 
of their lives and fortunes: 
“I have become wise. I know that it is madness to throw away what you possess. 
The man who has never experienced the sorrow and frustration of going to ask 
others for help in his need ha no idea of the usefulness of money. If a man has 
no experience to tell him how painfully money is acquired, moreover, he 
spends it with ease. ... It is most desirable my dear children to be thrifty. ... 
[Although he adds] God forbid. Let our worst enemies be avaricious. There is 
nothing like avarice to destroy a man’s reputation and public standing.”54 
The danger of avarice, doubtless with evident moral overtones, is ne-
vertheless primarily associated with reputation. This does not make the 
assessment purely worldly, as Weber thought, but in fact shows precisely the 
extent to which the respectable Christian citizen found his own professional 
responsibility to be a near extension of virtue; for “thrift” and prudence are 
immediately contrasted with prodigal young men: 
“What could I find to call them but ‘damned pestilence’? Thoroughly off the 
road themselves, they lead others astray. Other young men see these prodigals 
of yours abounding in every sort of entertainment, and since it is the vice of the 
young to prefer places of delight to the workshop ... they quickly join them in 
the consumption of luxuries and delicacies. They live a life of idleness, avoid 
the kinds of activity men praise. ... Oh Lord, what crimes do they not commit, 
merely to continue it? They rob their fathers, their relatives, their friends, they 
pawn and they sell. ... Finally, my dear Lionardo, these prodigals are left poor 
and full of years, without honor and with few, or rather no, friends. Those joyful 
leaches whom they took for friends in their great days of spending, those lying 
flatterers who praise their over-spending ... and called it a virtue, who, glass in 
54    Leon Battista Alberti, The Family in Renaissance Florence: Book Three, translated by Renee 
Neu Watkins (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 1994), 28. 
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hand, swore and promised to lay down their life –you have seen the water 
swarming with fish while the bait’s afloat; when the bait is gone, all is deserted 
and empty.”55 
The avaricious receive no better from Giannozzo, but the mean between 
avarice and prodigality is “thrift” rather than “liberality” (as it was in the 
Scholastics). “Thrift” is a “holy thing,” “all thrift consists no so much in pre-
serving things as in using them at need.”56 Thrift is the proper use of one’s own 
and “there are three things which a man can truly call his own”: his spirit, his 
body, and his time.57 To heal the body, care properly for the spirit and wisely 
dedicate its energies to family and honorable conduct in the sight of God require 
discipline of the body, of the spirit and of one’s time. In direct response to the 
question of his way of devotion, his way of keeping the soul pleasing to God, 
Giannozzo responds: 
“I have two ways. One is to try and do all I can to keep my spirit joyful. I try 
never to let my mind be troubled by anger or or greed or any other excessive 
passion. This I have always believed to be an excellent way. The pure and 
simple spirit, I believe, is the one that pleases God the most. The other way I 
have of pleasing God, it seems to me, consists in doing nothing of which I am 
doubtful whether it be good or bad. 
Alberti’s book is dressed with such a hallowed religious tone despite its 
worldly advice. The whole point, it is important to remember and emphasize, is 
that all the worldly advice that Giannozzo gives is set within this image of 
responsible patriarchal and Christian civic duty, it is not a simply secular vision 
but the ethos of a respectable citizen and the bourgeois religiosity which is a 
critical element of his self-image as worthy of dignified, reputable social 
standing. 
This framing is, for men bent on not seeing it, easily forgotten when he 
launches into the details of good management: “The maxims of the old 
seigniorial way of life were now utterly rejected. Expenditure had dominated 
the feudal economy, ... But now income was the governing factor in all eco-
nomic activities. ‘Be mindful, O my sons, never to let your expenditure exceed 
your income.’ That is the last word of wisdom in the third volume of Alberti’s 
work, as indeed it is the conclusion of Pandolfini’s treatise.”58 With thrift, now 
55    Alberti, The Family in Renaissance Florence, 29-30. 
56    Alberti, The Family in Renaissance Florence, 33. 
57    Alberti, The Family in Renaissance Florence, 34. 
58    Sombart, The Quintessence of Capitalism, 106. 
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nearly identical in its conception of solicitudinous balance to the prudence of 
Scholastic moral theology in similarly worldly contexts, saving is extolled: “The 
idea of saving thus came into the world; of saving not as a necessity but as a 
virtue. ... A man like Giovanni Rucellai, who owned thousands, adopted the 
maxims of a country yokel, that ‘to save a penny is more honorable than to spend 
a hundred.’“59 Such economization of finances is matched by the economization 
of time: 
“My plan, therefore, is to make as good use of time as possible on praiseworthy 
pursuits. I do not spend my time on base concerns. I spend no more time on 
anything than is needed to do it well. ... And to waste no part of such a precious 
thing, I have a rule that I always follow: never remain idle. I avoid sleep, and I 
do not lie down unless overcome by weariness, for it seems disgraceful to me 
to fall without fighting or to lie beaten ... First thing in the morning when I 
arise, I think to myself, ‘What are the things I have to do today?’ There are a 
certain number of things, and I run through them, consider, and assign to each 
some part of my time. ... and in the evening, before I retire, I think over again 
what I have done during the day.”60 
Such an attitude is worthy of the medieval Franciscan ascetic or the Roman 
Stoic –indeed, the daily effort to plan one’s day in advance and note one’s 
performance in the evening, all these things practices can be found in any 
ancient work or monastic regulae on the ethical ‘care of the self.’61 In fact, as 
Max Weber noted, this is, in some respects, a literary theory –and more than one 
scholar has noted the resemblance to Xenophon’s Oeconomia and the pseudo-
Aristotelian Economics.  
Yet, contrary to Weber, the book is not simply a literary fiction that could 
not possibly inspire.62 The popularity of the book, not to mention its re-
semblance to a number of other similar works and to the multiplicity of 
merchant manuals as well as concordance with the religious elaboration of the 
same quasi-virtues found in the preaching of the age, i.e., diligence, dedication, 
59    Sombart, The Quintessence of Capitalism, 106. 
60    Alberti, The Family in Renaissance Florence, 42. 
61   For a discussion of ancient and early Christian ethical practice, asceticism as a theme nece-
ssarily associated with any ethos, see Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, ed. Frederic 
Gros, English ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). 
62    Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons 
with a foreword by R. H. Tawney (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1930), notes to chapter 2, note 
12, 194-198: “But how can anyone believe that such a literary theory could develop into a revolutionary 
force at all comparable to the way in which a religious belief was able to set the sanctions of salvation 
and damnation on the fulfillment of a particular (in this case methodically rationalized) manner of life”.  
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prudence, honesty, repute, surely make the application of the practices of 
discipline to the economic life found in Alberti and similar works rather more 
important than less. For rather than the book inspiring merchants, though it may 
well have, it is the book that often breathes an inspiration that was, in fact, 
reflected in commercial tracts of the Renaissance and in their lives as well and 
in innumerable documents and discourse of the age. Moreover, as we have seen, 
a substantial religious and civic history lay behind this “literary” and “secular” 
theory. And any substantial ethos involves an ideal of oneself and an ascetic 
imposition upon oneself in order to move oneself toward that ideal –the 
motivation, here in Alberti, is not simply profit and gain. Rather, more deeply, 
it is honor and respectability, even social distinction through achievement and 
reputation for grandeur and nobility. That these objects of social ambition were 
very much and very confusingly bound up with religious and civic aspirations 
suggests a strong tremor of energy conducive to the imposition of the discipline 
of prudence in one’s life. This applies even if the approbation is through one’s 
own conscience and only in one’s eyes as formed by social ideals, and is perhaps 
particularly so in the case of the most energetic characters. 
In fact, Alberti’s dialogue reaches its critical point in an exchange between 
Lionardo and Giannozzo when the former reasserts the energetic ethos of civic 
humanism against the evident inclination of the latter toward a more tranquil 
and non-civic oriented life of private quasi-religious virtue: “Giannozzo’s 
eulogy of a private existence devoted to mercantile pursuits is followed by one 
of the most eloquent pages written in the spirit of political humanism”: 
‘I would say that a good citizen loves tranquility, but not so much his own 
tranquility as that of all good men. He rejoices in his private leisure but does 
not care less about that of his fellow citizens than he does about his own. He 
desires the unity, calm, peace and tranquility of his own house, but much more 
those of the country and the republic. ... So you see, Giannozzo, that the 
admirable resolve to make private onesta one’s sole rule in life, though noble 
and generous in itself, may not be the proper guide for spirits eager to seek 
glory. Fame is born not in the midst of private peace but in public action. Glory 
is obtained in public squares; reputation is nourished by the combined voices 
and judgments of many honorable people and in the midst of the multitude. ... 
Nor would I call it lust for power if a man shows great care and interest in doing 
hard and generous things, for these are the way to honor and glory.”63 
63    Hans Baron, “Civic Wealth and the New Values of the Renaissance”, 266-267. 
The Spiritual Formation of the Bourgeois Merchant 189 
CAURIENSIA, Vol. XI (2016) 157-196, ISSN: 1886-4945 
Thus, without wanting to detract from the importance of the more ordinary, 
less political ambitions of the ordinary merchant and his rationality, the very 
dignity and quiet respectability of the citizen-merchant was closely bound up 
with the fact that its counterpart was an illustrious ideal of civic service. That 
fame and glory attached to the great mercantile families of the day belonged, in 
no small part, to their role within the city, their social personae and public 
action. It was, in fact, the more ordinary and earlier merchant whose religiosity 
was justified as a kind of civic figure, but it is the illustrious personae that pathed 
the way for abundant social recognition of the merchant and the more strained 
association of private professional virtues and general moral virtues. 
In addition to such social imagery concerning the combination of general 
moral virtues and private professional virtues that evince an ethos of proper 
conduct in business according to an organized and prudent schema, reflecting a 
responsible and orderly state of desire, the same ethos was equally expressed in 
commercial solemnities: “[l]ate medieval contracts and business documents are 
laced with oaths, invocations of God, and professions of pious good faith. The 
expression, ‘in the name of God and profit,’ occurs repeatedly as a kind of 
invocation in late medieval partnership contracts and account books. The phrase 
was born of the belief not only that, as one writer put it, ‘wealth is the 
recompense for piety,’ but also that a devout Christian would adhere to his 
contractual commitments more faithfully than a sinner, infidel, or Jew.”64 These 
solemnities extended beyond the simple addition of phrases into action: “Each 
time they drew up or revised a budget, a fund for the poor was created with some 
of the capital of the company. These funds were entered in the books in the name 
of ‘our Good Lord God’ as representing the poor, who in this way, were made 
partners of the company. When the dividends were paid, a proportional part thus 
went to the poor.”65 Contracts themselves were not infrequently sealed with 
more than a simple oath: “An offering was made every time a contract of sale 
or purchase was drawn up. In France it was called denier a Dieu, in Germany 
Gottespfennig, in Italy, Denaro di Dio. This money served as a deposit, but it 
was always destined for pious works, not for the seller. There are even statutes 
which affirm its legal position, establishing that once the money was handed 
over, the Good Lord was henceforth considered as its witness, and the contract 
could not be modified or broken.”66 Or again, there is the constantly reiterated 
exhortation found in manuals, seen in Alberti, of going to Mass as a sort of 
64    Margaret Carroll, “In the name of God and Profit”, Representations 44 (1993): 96-13; 105. 
65    Armando Sapori, The Italian Merchant in the Middle Ages, translated by Patricia Ann Kennen 
(New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1970), 23. 
66    Sapori, The Italian Merchant in the Middle Ages, 24-25. 
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preface to one’s work: “surprising to a modern mind inclined to divorce business 
from religion is the fact that exhortations of this kind are found in merchant 
manuals as late as the seventeenth century, for example, in Le parfait negociant 
written by Jacques Savary, who was by no means a saint but a hardheaded 
businessman.”67 Indeed, while it may be surprising to the modern mind, the 
strength of the emerging adverse judgment upon the poor and lazy, those who 
lack the rigorous habits that attend virtuously to business, is readily accepted 
and can serve as something of an indirect measure of the extent to which this 
mindset and self-image influenced the higher ranks of merchant elite and 
inspired them with a sense of their own dignity and social ambition. 
The lazy and indolent were, not unlike the usurious Jew and now marginal 
avaricious miser, marked with certain characteristic vices opposed to Christian 
social conduct and to the normal functioning of a Christian market. For the 
Christian market presumed certain ethical a priori in which one could trust and 
therefore a certain recognition of others that came in and through exchange 
relations. Along with the usurious, the overly luxurious and the miser, the mo-
nopolist who forced up prices, the speculator whose manipulations influences 
prices but produced nothing, the indolent were castigated as those who unne-
cessarily and presumptuously relied upon the charity of others. These as well 
were called out for their lack of discipline and strength of character: “The sin of 
acedia, originally that of spiritual sloth and the neglect of religious obligations, 
had, by the fifteenth century, been replaced by the concept of physical idleness 
in popular preaching.”68 Despite the word “replaced” being an exaggeration, the 
notion of physical idleness in want of employment or indolence and carelessness 
at work, certainly took its place alongside spiritual sloth –or rather, it blended 
with that concept insofar as virtue itself was also adopting certain professional 
“virtues.” It was but the concomitant negative judgment connected with the mo-
re positive light in which professional responsibility was now viewed: “It is 
possible to trace two distinct attitudes to the poor in these works. The first, which 
appears to be typical of Conventual literature, is characterized by its emphasis 
on the concept of the ‘deserving’ poor. While the notion that the receivers of 
alms had to prove themselves morally worthy had precedents in both patristic 
and Scholastic theology, the manner of its presentation in Dominican sermons 
and treatises is more closely aligned to contemporary bourgeois attitudes. ... 
These secular attitudes to both the ‘poveri vegognosi’ [shame-faced poor too 
67    de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence, 14. 
68    Paton, Preaching Friars and the Civic Ethos, 169; for the development of this line of thought 
in popular preaching, Siegfried Wenzel, The Sin of Sloth: Acedia in Medieval Thought and Literature 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960). 
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proud to beg] and the undeserving poor are clearly reflected in Conventual 
Franciscan sermons ... These attitudes contrast markedly with that displayed by 
contemporary Franciscan Observant preachers ... they were more inclined to 
identify themselves with the poor of the city than the moneyed classes [and to 
advocate unconditioned charity].”69 However, regardless of the differences of 
emphasis between orders and factions thereof, most preachers made significant 
critical remarks on both the wealthy and the poor and it was certainly a matter 
of emphasis that separated their messages. 
This constant even-handedness is evident in the fact that alongside the 
professional duties of an employer entailed responsibilities to his employees, 
there was no extraordinary emphasis on the indolence of the worker: 
“Sant’Antonino was impartial: he stressed the duties of the workers toward their 
masters as well as the obligations of the latter toward their subordinates. He had 
no good word to say about workers who were careless, spoiled their masters’ 
materials, or were slow in returning them.”70 It is not that such an attitude more 
critical of laborers and the poor was suddenly dominant and lopsidedly elitist, 
but that it appears to have finally found an express articulation is reflective of 
the more important fact that professional responsibilities had come to be viewed 
as expressions of general virtues in lay practice of religious life. This view 
certainly found a significant and exaggerated voice, one that portends the future 
of secular economic nationalism, in the works of the younger generation of 
humanists such as Matteo Palmieri: 
“let the working masses and the humblest sector of the middle class struggle 
for the good of the Republic. Those who are lazy and indolent in a way that 
does harm to the city, and who can offer no just reason for their condition, 
should either be forced to work or be expelled from the Commune. The city 
would thus rid itself of that harmful part of the poorest class.”71 
More important than an assessment of potential elitism in condemnation of 
indolence, however, was the fact that this was part of the general proposition 
that “the harmfulness of economic behaviors derived, in a final analysis, from 
indifference to the religious and civic solidarity that should hold the civic market 
69    Paton, Preaching Friars and the Civic Ethos, 199-205. 
70    de Roover, San Bernadino of Siena and Sant’Antonino of Florence, 27. 
71    Matteo Palmieri, Delia vita civile in Biblioteca Enciclopedica, 381-382; cited in John McGo-
vern, John. “The Rise of New Economic Attitudes-Economic Humanism, Economic Nationalism-du-
ring the Later Middle Ages and the Renaissance, A.D.1 200-1500”. Traditio 26 (1970): 217-253; 237-
238. 
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together.”72 It is not that religious and civic conduct are considered to be directly 
the most economically advantageous in any instance, but that economic 
behavior contrary to the religious-civic ethos cut at the foundations of the very 
society that made the market possible. This general proposition is the funda-
mental context for the emergence of the merchant as an esteemed social figure 
and, evidently, the vision of poverty as both pitiable and despised. It is not just 
wealth that is in some way tainted, but now poverty is tainted. For it is only 
where general virtue transformed itself to include proper concern with the 
details of one’s officium that the skillful conduct and attention to successful 
performance of a particular profession could be associated with dedicated servi-
ce to the community through economic activity. In fact, it is only in light of such 
a confluence of social values that there could be that characteristic shame that 
attended the fall of a once successful or rich man and family to the status of 
poveri vergognosi (shame-faced poor), a status to which friars were particularly 
attentive and sympathetic.73 
The question, however, arises as to the specifically Christian character of 
those professional virtues and the market sociability. If the merchant emerged 
from the age with an idealized image of moderation, loyalty, honesty, simplicity 
and prudence, these are partly expressions of the fact of a great many profe-
ssional requisites found their place in connection with more generally reco-
gnized Christian virtues. Mercantile life and virtue were, so they thought, wi-
thin, or very nearly within, the grasp of natural man. If the merchant emerges as 
a public figure of immense importance, or even as a highly respected member 
of the community with a moderately public-minded ethos and a set of manners 
befitting his social identity, this is partly on account of the conception of the 
market as an extension of sociable conduct servicable to the welfare of the 
community that derived from the unity of religious urgings to the common good 
and the already intense patriotic sentiment of Italian city-states. 
Within this setting, the social identity of the merchant, regardless of the full 
extent of its reality in their individual practice, was undoubtedly of influence on 
their self-image and their exalted conception of the dignity of their work and 
their status or officium within the community. Such a sociable and chivalrous 
view needed no absolute purity of religious motive to exist, partial religious 
approbation and civic caritas was enough for that; for with those came motives 
of honor, a sense of dignity in dutiful conduct, motives that might drive a man 
onward. Certainly the merchant was not so immune to considerations of self-
72    Todeschini, Franciscan Wealth, 161. 
73    Debby, Renaissance Florence in the Rhetoric of Two Popular Preachers, 166. 
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respect and honor, illustrious fama, that some might not labor for them, perhaps 
day and night, and strive for all that they bring in their wake. The prizes to be 
won cannot be ignored in their full weight –wife of good-standing, friends, 
contacts, wealth, self-respect, social distinction, etc. Profit and the satisfaction 
of wants, those reductive modern words, utterly fail to capture why men work 
and the differences in intensity that those motives give rise to. That social and 
religious ethics centered their focus on these aspects of human life and gave 
them the character of nearly qualifying criteria for social recognition and 
Christian respectability, is of significant import in providing the basis for an 
object of social ambition in distinction along these lines.  
In other words, the message of preachers and humanists did not merely 
function to restrain, therefore, rather, it also –despite its moderate and simple 
intentions– inspired and formed from within. If they provided a conception of 
virtue particular to one’s profession and if that conception fostered a social 
identity, with a dignity required of it and an honorable status afforded by it, then 
the message was of significance in the formation of a social group identity that 
encouraged a certain conduct and fostered a certain intensity in the merchant’s 
motives. It undoubtedly had influence in the formation of the medieval and 
Renaissance merchant’s conduct and the intensity with which he sought to apply 
that respectable professional rationality to his life. In fact, that was precisely 
what it led him to do – to impose a calculating rationality upon himself and to 
take on certain stylistic stereotyped features of prudence and circumspection that 
are very much akin to a civilized asceticism or moderate version of a harmo-
nious soul as projected by Aristotelian ethics. And indeed, many leading men 
displayed such prudence and intensity in the imposition upon their lives of a 
regimen of professional virtues that were imbued with all the values of self-
worth as a human person and social figure. Many sought –increasingly– to 
choose a life of commercial endeavor and to strive therein for the honors that 
came with wealth and at least some, often a significant amount of, patriotism 
and conscious Christian attire. To highlight, as we have above, the critical role 
of the mendicant orders, the Dominicans and Franciscans, as well as 
Renaissance humanists very much imbued with similar perceptions of poverty 
and Stoicism, in weaving this attire and the whole figure of civilized commerce 
is precisely not to exclude a complexity of motives, but to insist heavily on that 
point in favor of recognizing the cultural, social and religious constitution of the 
merchant’s soul.  
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